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Author

  • Björn Schnizler (5)
  • Daniel Veit (5)
  • Dirk Neumann (5)
  • Torsten Eymann (5)
  • Werner Streitberger (5)
  • Michael Reinicke (3)
  • Felix Freitag (2)
  • Georg Buss (2)
  • Isaac Chao (2)
  • Pablo Chacin (2)

Year of publication

  • 2005 (2)
  • 2006 (2)
  • 2007 (1)

Document Type

  • Report (3)
  • Working Paper (2)

Keywords

  • Grid Computing (4)
  • grid computing (1)

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Show/Hide Abstract Environmental Analysis for Application Layer Networks (2005)
Björn Schnizler Dirk Neumann Daniel Veit Mauro Napoletano Michele Catalano Mauro Gallegati Michael Reinicke Werner Streitberger Torsten Eymann
Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechners über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt.
Show/Hide Abstract Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks -Annual Report Year 1 (2005)
Torsten Eymann Michael Reinicke Werner Streitberger Björn Schnizler Daniel Veit Felix Freitag Isaac Chao Pablo Chacin Dirk Neumann
This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document.5
Show/Hide Abstract A Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS (2006)
Björn Schnizler Dirk Neumann Daniel Veit Michael Reinicke Werner Streitberger Torsten Eymann Felix Freitag Isaac Chao Pablo Chacin
The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project.
Show/Hide Abstract Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 2 (2006)
Torsten Eymann Werner Streitberger Daniel Veit Georg Buss Björn Schnizler Dirk Neumann
In this work the self-organising potential of the CATNETS allocation mechanism is described to provide a more comprehensive view on the research done in this project. The formal description of either the centralised and decentralised approach is presented. Furthermore the agents’ bidding model is described and a comprehensive overview on how the catallactic mechanism is incorporated into the middleware and simulator environments is given.
Show/Hide Abstract Theoretical and Computation Basis for CATNETS - Annual Report Year 3 (2007)
Daniel Veit Georg Buss Björn Schnizler Dirk Neumann Werner Streitberger Torsten Eymann
In this document the developments in defining the computational and theoretical framework for economical resource allocation are described. Accordingly the formal specification of the market mechanisms, bidding strategies of the involved agents and the integration of the market mechanisms into the simulator were refined.

search hits 1 to 5

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